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- ART. IX.—1. *La Russie sous Nicolas 1<sup>er</sup>*, par M. IVAN GOLOVINE. Paris. 1845.
2. *Pictures from St. Petersburg*, by EDWARD JARMANN. Translated from the original German, by FREDERIC HARDMANN. New York: Putnam & Co. 1852.
3. *Annuaire des Deux Mondes: Histoire Générale des Divers Etats*. (1851–1852.) Paris. 1852. Livres premier, cinquième, et sixième: *La France, La Russie, Empire Ottoman*.

THE vast territory lying between the Baltic and the Sea of Ochotsk, bounded by the Frozen Ocean on the north, by Persia and the Chinese empire on the south, embracing the entire northern section of two of the grand geographical divisions of the earth, with a foothold upon a third larger in extent than any other country in Europe beside itself,—inhabited by eighty distinct tribes of men, who, as to habits, language, and religion, differ more among themselves than from other nations,—watered by deep and navigable rivers, that traverse its level surface in either direction, transporting the products of a most fertile soil to the inland seas of its southern frontier, or losing themselves in the circumpolar snows that hardly define its northern limit,—bearing on its soil alike the boundless and almost impenetrable pine-forests of the North, the wheat-fields of the Ukraine, capable alone of sustaining more than a hundred millions of human beings, and the fruits that ripen only beneath a tropical sun,—availing itself of every branch of industry and art, and every species of primitive toil, from that of the Arctic fisherman earning his scanty subsistence by the light of the midnight sun, to that of the solitary Tartar shepherd watching his flocks beneath the Chinese wall,—is ruled solely by the will, and is to every practical intent the possession, of one man, the heir of the imperial house of Romanoff.

But it is not alone the physical greatness of the Russian empire that makes it the most formidable single power, perhaps, in the world. The history of its expansion, and the very elements of its existence as a state, present much

more serious matter for the alarmist, than the simple exhibition of its gigantic proportions. The ideas of conquest and annexation, which have been transmitted from one sovereign to another till they have become the policy of the nation as well as the pride of its court, and which have annihilated obstacles and absorbed nationalities till they are now knocking at the portals of one of the oldest powers in Europe, with a purpose never more clearly defined, have come to be largely identified with the aspirations of the great Slavic race, which not only dominates in Russia, but ramifies extensively in the countries adjoining its southwestern frontier,—a race bewildered by the consciousness of its long dormant strength, and dreaming of an impossible future. Other empires as large, in the partly fabulous traditions of the East, and in the more positive history of the West, have been the growth, by incursion and conquest, of a single ambitious reign; and the heterogeneous mass, united for a time under one far-reaching sceptre, became resolved into its original elements upon the death or the fall of the conqueror. But the growth of Russia is coeval with the dynasty which has occupied its throne for nearly two centuries and a half, and the successors of Michael Feodorovitsch have rarely paused and never retrograded in the career of territorial aggrandizement. We propose to trace this policy of self-aggrandizement, from its origin in the obscurer annals of the nation, to its very last development in the recent acts of the reigning Czar, to consider the elements of weakness as well as of strength in the power that now threatens the political equilibrium of Europe, and to gather from the facts of the present crisis how easily a fear that has troubled the minds of men for nearly half a century has been dispelled by the promptness and vigor of a countervailing alliance.

While Attila was extending his dominions from the confines of China to the Atlantic, and causing himself to be proclaimed the King of Kings by the barbaric nations that had conquered the Roman empire, a peaceful tribe of Slavi, from the banks of the Dnieper, escaped from the turmoils of Southern Europe, and, wandering to the north and east, founded the two cities of Kiev and Novgorod, which still remain. The

latter settlement was the germ of the Russian nation. But little known to the writers of the period, described however by Constantine Porphyrogenitus as a peaceful people, mostly traders and purely democratic in their government, they took no place in history till the country and its inhabitants became the prey of Scandinavian adventurers. Unused to war, they had been compelled when attacked to call to their assistance the fierce tribes that constantly swarmed from the Northern peninsula. From mercenaries, these tribes came at last to be their masters, and about a thousand years ago (862), Ruric, the first chief in Russian history, divided the territory of the Novgorodians with two other Varagian chiefs, Sineus and Truvor. Upon the death of Ruric, the government devolved upon Oleg as guardian of the young prince Ighor, and during his regency, with the true barbarian instincts of the Northern hordes, the descendants of the Scythians turned their arms for the first time to the conquest of the fertile lands warmed by a more genial sun. By the subjugation of Smolensk and Kiev, Oleg united the two Slavic nations, and, securing thus the control of the Dnieper, undertook the *first Russian expedition against Constantinople*. An army of eighty thousand men sailed down the Dnieper, and, transporting their boats by land for the extent of the fifteen leagues where its navigation is rendered difficult by rapids, found themselves at last on the Black Sea. Leo, the Greek emperor, warned of their approach, drew a chain across the harbor of his capital; but the hardy adventurers took their barks on shore again, and, attaching to them wheels and sails, forced their way up to the very walls of the city, having marked their passage by the atrocities that usually attended the rude incursions of that age. Leo attempted to remove his enemy by poison, but, not being successful, was compelled to make an ignominious peace; and Oleg returned laden with spoils to a people disposed to regard him as more than human. A few years afterward, Ighor, deluded by the success of his guardian, without any ostensible motive, sailed down the Dnieper with a hundred and sixty thousand men, and attacked the Byzantine capital by sea. The Greeks hurled upon the boats of the Russians their unquenchable fire, to escape which the warriors plunged

into the sea, and the baffled chief retreated with only a third part of his army. Not discouraged by his reverses, Ighor returned three years afterward, but was met in the Tauric Chersonesus by the ambassadors of the Emperor Romanus, who offered to pay the same tribute which had been exacted before the failure of the last expedition.

Queen Olga is the next person who figures in Russian history. Ighor having been murdered in an attempt to quell an insurrection, his widow avenged his death by some of the most horrid acts of cruelty known in history. With every qualification to fill the chief niche in a pandemoniac temple, Olga now flourishes as a saint in the Russian calendar, and *her* expedition to Constantinople was for the purpose of being initiated into the mysteries of the Christian religion. Constantine Porphyrogenitus was highly interested in his royal convert, and led her with his own hand to the baptismal font, where she received the name of Helen. Olga's example had no influence upon the nation or on her own family, and it was not till the reign of Vladimir the Great that Christianity superseded the Paganism which was the natural religion of the fierce tribes that swarmed from the Northern hive. The prince sent his most intelligent philosophers into the neighboring countries to inquire into their respective religions, and, after a careful comparison, suffered himself to be swayed by the reports of the gorgeous ceremonies of the Greek Church and the magnificence of St. Sophia. Too proud to ask of the Emperor a priest to baptize him, Vladimir marched his army upon the city of Theodosia, and having solicited the aid of Heaven "to help him to take the town that he might carry from it Christians and priests to instruct him and his people," accomplished his purpose, receiving also in marriage the hand of Anna, sister of the joint Emperors Basil and Constantine, upon condition of converting his people to Christianity. He kept his word. The inhabitants were ordered to the river to be baptized, and they cheerfully obeyed, saying, with a more vivid appreciation of the form than of the spirit, that, if it were not good to be baptized, the prince and the Boyars would never have submitted to such a ceremony.

Russia was invaded in the early part of the thirteenth cen-

tury by Tuschî, son of Gengis Khan, with his hordes of Mongol-Tartars. The natives made a desperate but unavailing resistance, and the authority of the Khan became permanent. He accordingly placed on the throne those who flattered him by obsequiousness, or propitiated him by presents; and a succession of thirteen native princès held this inglorious sovereignty till the middle of the fourteenth century. Weakened by their own dissensions, and depressed by the rigor of a foreign yoke, the Russian principalities could no longer resist the warlike powers that attacked them on the south and west, and the inheritance of Vladimir became the prey of the Livonians and Poles. Attempts were made to deliver the country from the Tartars by Dimitri and Ivan, but with only temporary success. Moscow was plundered by Tamerlane, and still later a Tartar army overran the country and departed with an immense booty, including three hundred thousand prisoners, whom they sold into slavery. The final blow was inflicted by Ivan the Terrible, who succeeded to the throne at the age of three years, survived the anarchy and confusion which prevailed during his minority, seized the reins with a firm hand at seventeen, and by a series of brilliant military evolutions drove the Tartars from his dominions, and attacked their own country, granting quarter to the inhabitants only upon the condition of their adopting the Christian faith. Thus a supremacy which even the Russians looked upon as barbarian, and which had endured for three hundred years, was permanently destroyed, the country found itself under a government able to protect it, and its territory was extended eastward as far as the right bank of the Volga. Ivan sought to plant the seeds of Western civilization in the great nation slowly and silently maturing in the North. Splendid embassies were sent to the various European courts, and artists, merchants, and scholars were invited to settle in his capital. The discovery of Archangel by some English traders wrecked in its vicinity brought the country into intercourse with England, which was rapidly attaining its preëminence in commerce. Siberia was discovered by a party of outlawed Cossacks, and presented as a peace-offering to the Czar. With Feodor, son of Ivan II., terminated the dynasty of Ruric, which

had occupied the throne since the Varagian conquest, a period of seven hundred years.

The beginning of the seventeenth century was a gloomy period in the annals of Russia. The throne had been seized, since the death of the last descendant of Ruric, by usurpers, among whom was an impostor whose real name was Otrief, and whose history bears a strong resemblance to that of the pseudo-Dauphins of our own day. The crown was at last offered to a young noble whose father was metropolitan of Rostoff, and distantly connected with the ancient Czars; and in 1613 Michael Feodorovitch, of the house of Romanoff, was elected Czar, with unlimited and hereditary power. The influence of the clergy silenced all opposition, and a revelation from Heaven sanctioned the choice. Michael expelled the Swedes and Poles from his dominions, and reëstablished embassies at the Christian courts. With his son and successor Alexis commenced those encroachments upon the dependencies of the Porte, which continued without intermission till the treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Having incorporated the warlike Cossacks of the Don with his empire, Alexis extended his conquests southward till he annexed the country of Astrakhan. The jealousy of the Porte being fully awakened by the approach of Russia to the Crimea, a Turkish army crossed the frontier of Poland and entered the Ukraine. Alexis bequeathed the war to his son Feodor, who after five years of hostilities effected, in 1682, a truce for twenty years. During the regency of Sophia (sister of Feodor, Ivan, and Peter), the Porte declared war against Poland and the German Emperor; the latter asked the aid of Russia; and Galitzin, the favorite, suffered his vanity to get the better of his discretion, and took the field in person with a large army. By disease and in unprofitable skirmishes he had lost at the end of his second campaign more than forty thousand men. Upon the accession of Peter a regularly disciplined force was organized, and a navy founded upon European models. The war with the Porte still languishing, Peter resolved, by getting possession of the Black Sea and Azoph, to secure the outlet of the Don. The first campaign was not successful; but in the second, by the aid of engineers and artillery collected

in Germany, he was enabled to enter Azoph after a two months' siege. He at once ordered fifty-five ships to be built, and a canal to be constructed to connect the Don with the Volga, thus securing an easier communication with the Caspian Sea, and accomplishing the great idea of Alexis, the opening of a trade with Persia. In 1700 the armistice between Russia and Turkey was prolonged from two to thirty years; but before it had terminated, the Porte, instigated by Charles XII., declared war against Russia, and the Grand Vizier Mehemed mustered on the plains of Adrianople an army of two hundred and fifty thousand men. Peter left the affairs of his nation in the hands of a senate appointed for the purpose, and crossed the Pruth with forty thousand men; but deceived by the inability of the Hospodar of Moldavia (who thought the time had come when his people would gladly throw off the Mohammedan yoke) to render him any assistance, he was surrounded and compelled to retreat. The good genius of Catharine, not then acknowledged as his lawful wife, saved him. The Vizier readily entertained proposals of peace when accompanied by an immense sum of money and valuable jewels, and the dignity of the Porte was satisfied by the recovery of Azoph. In recompense, Russia subsequently obtained, by a well-timed interference in the domestic affairs of Persia, and by war, the cession of the cities Derbent and Bakou with their territory, and the provinces Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad, with the consent of the Porte. The five sovereigns who succeeded Peter were occupied with other matters than foreign conquest. The generals of Anna indeed humbled the pride of Mohammed V., who had succeeded the unlucky Achmet on the Turkish throne; but they were sent to Siberia by Elizabeth. The tragic end of Peter III., in whom the family of Holstein-Gottorp was united with that of Romanoff, was the commencement of a new and brilliant era.

With the reign of Catharine the Great, the foreign relations of Russia began to assume a new aspect. The wrongs of "unhappy Poland" have been the theme of patriot and poet. We have no space to discuss this subject; but we may venture to suggest that a country whose government



was the most corrupt and oppressive ever known,—whose people consisted of two classes, nobles and serfs, the latter of which had no natural rights whatever, and could be beaten, robbed, sold, or hung at the will of the other,—where feudalism prevailed in its most repulsive form, without the ideas of Western civilization which even in the Middle Ages softened its injustice by the pride of chivalry,—has received quite as much sympathy from republicans as it merited, great as may be the political disadvantages of its annihilation as a kingdom.

The Western nations that had fomented the discontent in Poland found it also for their interest to excite the apprehension of Turkey. Mustapha III., jealous of the increasing influence of the Empress, and over-estimating the military resources of an empire which had once indeed struck terror into the hearts of Christendom, required little persuasion to declare war, and an irregular body of Turkish troops crossed the Russian frontier and ravaged the country. Aware of the external aid afforded to the Sultan, Catharine aimed to humble him by all the resources at her command. Her agents organized an insurrection in Greece, with a view to the establishment of the republics of Sparta and Athens, as a check to the Ottoman power. A Turkish fleet of fifteen ships of the line was burned in Tchesmè Bay by a Russian squadron, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia submitted to her arms, and a large Ottoman army was defeated near the right bank of the Pruth. At the peace of 1774, Catharine abandoned all her conquests except Azoph, Taganrog, and Kinburn, but obtained, besides indemnity for the expenses of the war, the free navigation of the Black Sea, the right of passage through the Dardanelles, and the protectorate of the Crimea, which a few years later was conquered by Potemkin, who gave it its ancient name of Tauris. The second war, declared by the Porte in 1787, resulted equally to the advantage of Russia. Oczakow was taken after a siege of six months, and finally separated from Turkey. The real object, however, for which the war had been provoked by Catharine,—the final expulsion of the Turks from Europe,—failed through the ill success of her ally, the Emperor of Austria. Beside the two hundred

thousand square miles which Catharine added to the territory of Russia, her reign was the commencement of a period of reforms within and an influence without, which may well excite the admiration of those who consider the nation she had to govern, and the private profligacy of the persons she selected as the instruments of her policy.

The Emperor Paul effected an alliance with Turkey, and at the same time added to the influence of Russia in the Mediterranean, by assuming the protectorate of the seven Ionian Isles, an office now sustained by England. What consequences would have resulted to Europe from his coöperation in the gigantic schemes of Napoleon, whom he all but adored, cannot be known. His assassination at a well-known political crisis, and under the most extraordinary circumstances, is a matter which has been too studiously ignored by the historians of that nation which profited by it so much and so unexpectedly.

But at no period in history has Russia been so overbearing and iniquitous in aggressions, as during the half-century for which she has been under the fostering care of Great Britain. From the death of Paul to the sudden change in her policy, in the summer of 1853, there has been no act of insolence or rapacity on the part of the Northern despot in which England has not cheerfully acquiesced, and few in which she has not borne a conspicuous and dishonorable part. So warm a friend of Napoleon as Charles Fox refused to conclude any peace "except in concert with the Emperor of Russia." A quarrel having arisen between the Sultan and the Czar in 1806, respecting the removal of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, Turkey received promise of the alliance of France; whereupon one Mr. Wellesley Pole "presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced that, if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes."\* Sir John Duckworth and his fleet entered the Dardanelles; but the Turks, encouraged by the skill and enthusiasm of General

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\* Sir Archibald Alison, from whom we quote, considers this transaction a *chef-d'œuvre* of diplomacy.

Sebastiani, the French ambassador, compelled him to make a precipitate and ignominious flight, with considerable loss. After the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon allowed Alexander to occupy the Principalities with his troops, yet refused to listen to any proposition concerning Roumelia and Constantinople, and in 1810 an imperial ukase announced the formal annexation of Moldo-Wallachia to Russia, and declared the Danube, from the Austrian frontier to the Black Sea, to be the southern boundary of the empire. By the treaty of Bucharest (1812), these provinces were ceded again to Turkey in exchange for Bessarabia, which gave Russia the control of the mouths of the Danube, an incalculable advantage to her in the event of a war with either Austria or Turkey, enabling her to advance as far as the Pruth. This insane treaty was forced upon Turkey, (at a time when, by a coöperation with France, she might have recovered all the ground she had lost in a quarter of a century,) by the influence of England, aided by the misrepresentations and treacherous disclosures of the other powers allied against France. It liberated an army of forty thousand Russians, who hung on the rear of the French in the retreat from Moscow, and finished but too well what the elements had commenced. At the general convocation of the harpies at Vienna, Russia, through the obsequiousness of Lord Castlereagh, obtained all it demanded; Poland was sacrificed; and to prevent the necessity of Alexander's restoring Finland, Norway was detached from Denmark and given to Sweden as an equivalent, — Great Britain volunteering to enforce this arrangement by threatening Denmark with a declaration of war within forty-eight hours if she did not accede to it. With the horrors of Copenhagen so fresh in her remembrance, the feeble state submitted. There were only two points on which Lord Castlereagh ventured really\* to differ from Alexander. The first was the violation of the treaty with Murat, by which the king of Naples was to be protected upon joining the grand alliance; the second was the violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau, by which Napoleon was to be maintained in state at Elba; — both of which compacts Alex-

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\* Apprehensive of a change or repentance in the mind of Alexander, a secret treaty was concluded between England, Austria, and what was called *France*.

ander considered it dishonorable not to adhere to, while the English minister, without any such foolish scruples, urged the Congress to depose Murat, and to send the fallen Emperor a close prisoner to St. Lucie or St. Helena. It was this contemplated perfidy, which, coming to the knowledge of Napoleon, determined him to anticipate the danger by leaving Elba.

When, on the voluntary renunciation of the crown by Constantine, Nicholas ascended the throne, he found the country he was to govern in the position of a single, vast camp. The Russo-Polish forces were arranged as an army drawn up for battle, facing to the *west* as the only source from which danger was to be apprehended, extending from Finland to the Pruth, and numbering four hundred and eighty thousand men. Besides this formidable array there were two hundred and sixty-seven thousand troops in garrison and on service in Finland, Siberia, and the Caucasus. To an army of seven hundred and forty-seven thousand men there could, moreover, be easily added some three hundred thousand from the Tartar hordes. The question naturally arises, and may be appropriately considered here, why, with such an overwhelming armament, Russia has had such difficulty in her conquests, and has really accomplished so little in her offensive operations. The truth seems to be, that these enormous figures appear only on paper, and cannot be filled up in actual service. The physical extent of Russia is out of all proportion to its financial resources. The interior is really poor, and can contribute nothing but men; and this want of the sinews of war enforces the necessity of economy in every branch of the service. The regiments therefore are four times the usual size, and the officers disproportionately few; the commissary department has been at times positively disgraceful to a nation of the rank of Russia; the medical staff is inadequate and notoriously incompetent; the engineers are respectable, but inferior to those of the other great military nations. Nor is the system of recruiting, or the kind of stimulus he receives, apt to make a good soldier of the Russian peasant. Orders are issued to the Head Man of each village to furnish a given number of men, usually in the proportion of five to a thousand inhabitants. His authority is then absolute. The houses are

entered in the night, the recruits selected at random, stripped of every thing but the little cross about the neck, with which the Russian peasant never parts, and clothed in the uniform of the corps they are to enter. These arbitrary seizures were formerly considered equivalent to a sentence of perpetual banishment, and the young soldier bade adieu to his friends and his home for ever; but the time of service is now limited to a very few years, and the serf is often bettered by having served in the army. The Russian soldier is docile, submissive, patient, and cunning, with a passive rather than active courage, — resisting a charge well enough, but often requiring to be driven on by blows from his officer to make an assault. On one occasion in the Caucasus, a Russian corps assailed by grape-shot refused to advance. The general in command seated himself on a drum in the front, called out of the ranks a certain number of men, and directed them to be beaten. The battalion was then ordered to advance, and the Circassians were put to flight. The argument for flogging is simple and conclusive. “The stick,” says the Russian disciplinarian, “is something sure and positive; they cannot escape from it, and the effect is terrible; while the ball of the enemy is uncertain.” M. Golovine may well add, that, if there is any thing more barbarous than to beat a man, it is to apologize for such an act and to erect it into a system; and he adduces the victories of the French army, which has never allowed flogging, to show the different effects of the two systems. Ill treated by his superiors, badly fed and clothed, flogged unmercifully, the Russian soldier soon becomes an inmate of the hospital, and dies a premature death.

This, however, is the darkest side of the picture, and one which is daily growing brighter. Reforms are never stationary in Russia, and the discipline of the army is gradually becoming more humane. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the bulk of the nation is not yet civilized in a European sense; the serf cannot be expected to have the same ideas of glory with a Frenchman, and if he *will* not fight, he must be *made* to fight, however repugnant the means used to compel him. The Imperial Guard is an exception, not the standard of the Russian army; the one hundred thousand men or

more which compose it are perhaps the finest military body in the world. Each regiment costs twice as much to keep it as a regiment of the line. Whole divisions are mounted on horses of the same color, with scarcely a hair to distinguish them. The Circassian cavalry kept for exhibition to strangers at the reviews in St. Petersburg consists of handsome men, with well-knit forms, cased in steel, as hard riders and as daring soldiers as any in the world; and the flying artillery, which is on a large scale, compares well with that of Germany and France.

Thus, while Russia offers no temptation to an invading army, and suffers the transition from peace to war with less inconvenience than any other country in Europe, the circumstances we have mentioned must for a long time prevent her from becoming formidable to a well-conducted alliance of the other powers. In the campaign of 1810, a Russian army one hundred thousand strong made no actual conquests in the Turkish territory, (for the occupation of the Principalities is always a matter of course at the outset of the Russo-Turkish wars,) and were confined to the places they originally held, by such forces as were then at the command of the Sultan. We need not be surprised, therefore, at the difficulty with which even the most trifling advantages on the soil of European Turkey have been since gained by the Czar.

Within a month after his coronation, Nicholas declared war against Persia. The Shah had declined acceding to the territorial extension which Russia was entitled to make under the treaty of Gulistan in 1823. Prince Menschikoff was refused an audience, and the Russian garrison at Arkivan was put to the sword. Paskevitch conducted the campaign: the Russians were everywhere victorious; two provinces in Asia were added to the empire; and the Shah agreed to pay twenty million silver rubles as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. In the mean time our Turkish friends had made themselves rather unfortunately conspicuous at Scio. In a slaughter which lasted twelve days, forty thousand of both sexes and all ages were butchered; every house was burned but those of the foreign consuls; and thirty thousand beautiful young women and boys, all that survived the horrible slaughter, were

sent to the slave-markets at Constantinople. The indignation of Europe was aroused, and the result was the battle of Navarino, in which the whole Turkish fleet was destroyed by the combined fleets of Russia, England, and France. There should have been no half-measures toward a power which had shown itself unfit to inhabit the earth. Its nationality should have been destroyed and its territory divided. But, unfortunately, this could not be done without sowing the seeds of future evil. What was done was worse than nothing; the entire gain was on the part of Russia; and Turkey was crippled so that she seemed an easy prey to the power which was only waiting for an opportunity to absorb it.

The last war between Russia and the Porte had its origin, like most wars, in a treaty of peace. Each party accused the other of having violated the treaty of Bucharest. Turkey reproached Russia with having supported and encouraged Ypsilanti, and with fomenting the disturbances in the Principalities; Russia in turn accused the Divan of having excited the Circassians to revolt, obstructed the commerce of the Black Sea, violated the amnesty accorded to Servia, encouraged the resistance of Persia, and retarded the peace which was about to be concluded with that power. After the usual diplomatic preliminaries, war was declared by Russia on the 7th of May, 1828, and a Russian army one hundred and five thousand strong crossed the Pruth at three points, under Count Wittgenstein. The Emperor took the field in person with Count Diebitsch at the head of his staff. Jassy and Bucharest were immediately occupied, and the capitulation of Brailow to the Grand Duke Michael gave Russia the control of the Lower Danube, and secured the communication with the reserved forces which had not yet crossed the Pruth. Varna surrendered after a siege of three months; but the siege of Shumla was raised on account of disease breaking out in the camp from cold and scarcity of food. The campaign in Asia was more successful than that in Europe, and many important fortresses fell into the hands of Paskevitch. The second campaign opened with still better auspices. The army was well provisioned, and its communications were preserved. Advancing in two columns, the Russians carried all the Turk-

ish outposts, crossed the range of mountains called the Balkan, and found itself at last before Adrianople, which surrendered without any resistance. The Emperor had in the mean time made a journey to Berlin, and the Prussian government through Baron Müffing urged the Porte to conclude a peace. Negotiations were commenced, and the treaty was signed at Adrianople, September 14, 1829. Russia retained the conquered territory in Asia Minor only, and the Dardanelles were opened to the merchant-ships of all nations. Turkey recognized the independence of Greece, granted independent administrations to Moldavia and Wallachia, restored their establishments on the left bank of the Danube, accorded religious liberty to all sects of Christians, and agreed to pay eleven million five hundred thousand rubles, afterwards reduced to three million, as an indemnity to Russian subjects. Russia abandoned all its conquests in Europe, and the army retired as had been stipulated. By the treaty of Adrianople the influence of the Czar in the affairs of the Porte became almost unlimited; but the rebellion of the Pacha of Egypt enabled Russia to obtain still greater advantages. A Russian squadron entered the Bosphorus, and a detachment landed at Bujukdere and prevented the capture of Constantinople. In gratitude for such timely assistance, a secret treaty was concluded between the two powers, by which the Porte agreed to keep the Dardanelles closed against every nation which should ever be at war with Russia,—an arrangement superseded by the treaty of London in 1841, which excluded all foreign ships of war from the Dardanelles.

Russia has lost no opportunity to impress the Asiatic tribes with a sense of her far-reaching power, but her attempts have not always been successful. The Russian and British embassies in Persia have always combined to exclude the influence of France; but latterly their intrigues have been directed against each other, apparently to the advantage of the former power. The Russian army has been occupied with the Circassian rebellion, and many a corps has found its grave in the inhospitable Caucasus. Yet the ill success of the Russian forces against Schamyl and his hardy mountaineers is no more an indication of their want of courage or skill, than are



the numerous reverses in Caffraria a proof of cowardice or incapacity in some of the best troops of the British army.

The history of the Russian intervention in the Hungarian Revolution is too familiar to be more than alluded to here; but some of its recent developments have a marked bearing upon what is now called the Eastern Question. Most of these have their proper place in any speculations which may suggest themselves as to the probable attitude of Austria in the event of a general war. Some of its features, however, prove the truth of what we have before stated respecting the studious obsequiousness with which England has avoided all suspicion of giving offence to Russia, till absolutely forced to oppose her designs upon Constantinople in the prospect of ruin to her manufactures. We will not discuss the morality of such a proceeding, but there is little doubt that, if Turkey had been properly encouraged by England or France, she could have secured the independence of Hungary, and her own at the same time. In June, 1848, while the insurrection was commencing in Hungary, a Russian army entered Moldavia. In September, Lord Palmerston, in reply to an interrogation on the subject, stated that "the Russian army had entered, at the request of the Prince of Moldavia, only to maintain the quiet of the provinces, and without orders from St. Petersburg; that the corps was not large, and its stay would be temporary." It appears that nothing in this statement was true; that Lord Palmerston either intended to deceive the English nation, or permitted himself to be most grossly blinded by Russia; and only two months later he communicated to Sir Stratford Canning at Constantinople the information that this very army was intended to march into Hungary! In December, the mediation of England was requested by Hungary, and Lord Palmerston answered that "the British government had no knowledge of Hungary but as a part of the Austrian empire"; and, to ingratiate himself with Austria, sent a copy of the correspondence to Vienna. Subsequent events show that the ministry dealt treacherously, not only with Hungary, but with Austria; but the immediate effect was to satisfy the imperial court that it had nothing to fear from England. In April, 1849, Lord Palmerston writes offi-

cially to the honest and unsuspecting envoy at Constantinople, on the authority of the Russian ambassador at London, that "it is *not* the intention of the Emperor of Russia to take any part in the Hungarian war," at a time when the Russian intervention was notorious at every court in Europe. As Lord Palmerston, it is well known, is one of the most liberal statesmen of England, we may indeed ask, When men like him exhibit such weakness or duplicity, what confidence can ever be placed in an English ministry?

But the great power, whose aggressive history it has thus far been our object to expose, has never caused so much anxiety in the minds of the civilized world as that which is holding Europe in suspense at the very moment we are writing. Before these pages will be read, it is possible that the three most powerful nations in the world may be at war. This is not the place for entering upon the details of the several stages of the negotiation, or for depicting the initiatory steps of the present war, between Russia and Turkey. The various items of information have been eagerly devoured by the American public upon the arrival of every steamer from Europe during the past year; but the historical causes which have afforded Nicholas a pretext for fresh aggression may not be quite so familiar. The proximate cause of the present crisis is the matter of the custody of the Holy Places and the protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey, which had its origin in the mission of Frangipani, ambassador of Francis I. to the Sultan Soliman, in 1526. The Sultan then consented to place under the protection of his Most Christian Majesty the Holy Places and the pious communities which guarded them, and till the Revolution of 1789 every treaty with the Ottoman Porte recognized the French protectorate. When her atheistic philosophy persuaded France to despise this glorious privilege, the Greek or schismatic Church, through its extensive political power, sought to regain what France had thrown away, and began to claim the exclusive protection of the sanctuaries erected to commemorate the principal events in the life of our Saviour. These holy places are chiefly in Syria, at Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Jerusalem; and the sanctuaries themselves are in memory of the Annunciation, Nativ-

ity, Transfiguration, Agony, Ascension, &c., besides several pertaining to the Virgin and St. John the Baptist. The most important of all is an amorphous collection of sanctuaries and convents inhabited by religious orders of different nations and creeds,—the Latin and the Greek, Armenian, Coptic, Syrian, Abyssinian, Georgian, and other dissenters from the dominant Byzantine Establishment. The edifice in which this heterogeneous assemblage pays its devotions, not upon a common altar, is the celebrated Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

In 1740, the Porte by treaty recognized as belonging to France the right of the sanctuaries, unfortunately without designating them in detail, while the Greek Church have produced real or pretended firmans in their favor, suspected to have been procured by the corruption of the Turkish Pachas. In 1808, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was partly consumed by fire, and the Greeks, more numerous and wealthy than the Latins, obtained leave to repair it at their own expense, thus gaining the exclusive possession of several additional altars. Though the disciples of the antagonistic creeds never actually prevented one another from praying at altars appropriated to either, yet in such ceremonies as lighting the sacred lamps, and in the privilege of making repairs, the Greek usurpation was complete. The French government, after many years of forced acquiescence in this state of things, at last found itself in a condition to make its influence felt, and in 1851 instructed its minister at the Porte to call the attention of the Divan to the disadvantageous position of the Catholic Christians in Turkey, and of France, their recognized protector. The Turkish government acknowledged a right founded upon the concessions of Soliman in 1526 and of Achmet in 1590, and defined by the treaty of 1740; but, overawed by the political power of the Greek Church, was unwilling to make the changes involved in a complete recognition of the claims of France, especially as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had expressed the opinion that the matter was not worth quarrelling about. At the same time, the Czar in an autograph note to the Sultan advised him to make no concessions to France, who desired none. The Ulemas therefore decided that what was already established ought not to be disturbed.

Upon the reorganization of the French government in December, however, the Porte, probably uneasy at the prospect of being always subject to the domination of Russia, and influenced, doubtless, by considerations which cannot be known till the diplomacy of the crisis takes its place in history, thought proper, by a firman of January, 1852, to accede to the demands of the French minister. It must have been anticipated by both powers that these concessions would be highly annoying to Russia; a disturbance was excited at Constantinople so formidable, that the Grand Vizier Reschid Pacha was degraded from his office to the Presidency of the Council of State; and in addition to this open deference to the Czar, the Greeks, supported by Nicholas, wrested from the distracted and vacillating Porte still another firman, which withdrew to a considerable extent the privileges accorded to the Catholics. The President of the French Republic assumed, without a moment's hesitation, the decided attitude necessary to repel the insolence of Russia, and from the line of action involved in that position he has never swerved. The French minister, created an ambassador for the purpose, hastened to Constantinople in the ship of war *Charlemagne*, which passed into the Dardanelles, and the Porte was assured that France was "in a humor and condition to cause her dignity and rights to be respected." This exhibition of resolution on the part of the French government has unquestionably had its influence for good or ill in the resistance the Porte has since made to other aggressions from Russia.

We have endeavored, in the above rapid glance at the history of Russia, to present the more prominent features of its policy towards Turkey. If we have dwelt with more particularity than would seem necessary upon the numerous wars which have broken out between the two powers, it has been that the traditional policy of territorial aggrandizement, and the constant disposition to gravitate toward Constantinople, might be clearly inferred from a plain narrative of events, rather than made the subject of unsupported hypothesis or vague declamation. We have also given the origin of the present conflict at some length, because we are confident that this early history of the matter will be new to many American

readers. Before going further, let us ascertain how far Russia has already succeeded in her interference with the affairs of the Porte, and what was her starting-point in the recent rupture. We shall perceive that former conquests and many years of intrigue have not been without their legitimate consequences, and that the Czar certainly held a position favorable to further encroachments.

The provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, known as the Danubian Principalities, are situated on the left bank of the largest river in Europe, which separates them from the other provinces of the anomalous power to which they are tributary, while only the narrow river Pruth divides them from the overgrown dominions of the Russian autocrat. The descendants of a colony planted by Rome to serve as a barrier against the invasions of the Northern hordes occupy regions whose desolation is the work of man. Fertile and well watered, a few years of uninterrupted peace would render them a source of riches to any powerful government with which they could become affiliated. The successors of Othman now exercise over them a barren sovereignty. Content with the geographical line which includes their territory within the limits of the Turkish empire, and with an annual tribute, doubled on the election of a new Hospodar, whom the Su'tan invests with authority only after the choice has been approved at St. Petersburg, they have left every thing else subject to the control which the Czar has obtained through his religious protectorate, and the splendor and force of his embassies. The government at present is that of a Prince or Hospodar elected for life from among the Boyars of the first rank; but this election cannot be ratified, nor can any organic changes whatever be made, without the permission of Russia. That these provinces should have remained so long in an unnatural connection with a power which for a century has never been able to protect them from invasion, conquered and overrun as they have been repeatedly by Catharine, Alexander, and Nicholas, is a political problem whose solution is to be found, not in the military prowess of Turkey, nor in the honesty or forbearance of Russia, but in that all-pervading vigilance which springs from the recognition of the principle of an equilibrium among

the European powers. The political fate of those insignificant states upon the confines of Asia depends at this moment upon the relations of the countries whose shores are washed by the Atlantic.

Just within the line where the Turkish frontier touches that of the Adriatic provinces of Austria exists another little state, containing about two hundred thousand inhabitants, whose institutions and independence are obscure and uncertain, but which holds no mean rank among the Slavic populations of Illyria. This is the country of the Tschernagora or Black Mountain, better known under its Italian name of Montenegro. Defended by a vast rampart of rocks, which secures them against any attack from without, the Montenegrins have given themselves up to a political influence within, which has sapped an independence virtually existing, though never recognized by the Sultan who claims to be their sovereign. The Turks were expelled from these mountain fastnesses in the last century, and ever since armed bands have descended from time to time to pillage the territory, not only of Turkey, but of Austria. A third power, unassailable in itself, has in the mean time availed itself of its very useful plea of Christian protection, which unhappily passes current in the East, and turned the peculiarities of the country to its own account. Montenegro is neither a possession nor a colony of Russia, but the Czar finds there a political centre from which his agents can correspond on one side with the Bosnians and Servians, and on the other with the Greeks and Albanians. Such were the relations of Montenegro with Russia when war broke out between the subject state and the Porte at the end of the year 1852.

With these vast influences encircling the tottering power of a nation whose predestined term of encampment upon the soil of Europe had nearly expired, Prince Menschikoff, with all the prestige of a splendid military staff, fresh from an imposing review of the forces of his master, arrived on the 28th of February, 1853, at Constantinople, charged with a mission whose object beyond a reasonable doubt was to overwhelm the Sultan with a sense of the irresistible resources of Russia, or to force the Porte to a war in which the banner of the

Prophet should wave for the last time over the plains of Roumelia. The haughty Russian in his first interview employed a language which was not misunderstood by the European courts, and the French and English fleets immediately sailed for Salamis, and thence to Besika Bay. Not yet confident, however, of a definite and adequate support from the two great powers that seemed disposed to guarantee at least a free action on the part of the Divan, and unwilling to involve his country in an expensive, if not a fatal war, the Sultan acceded at last to the demands of Russia. Presuming upon a success which was probably neither anticipated nor desired, the Russian ambassador required still further concessions, and presented the ultimatum from St. Petersburg, demanding for the Czar a protectorate over all the Greek Christians in Turkey, and equal rights for them with the other subjects of the Porte. A proposition which involved a virtual surrender of his sovereignty might well cause the Sultan to hesitate. The answer returned to Prince Menschikoff was not satisfactory, and the embassy left the court. Then commenced the negotiations, the result of which was the announcement at St. Petersburg, in June, that the Sultan had finally declined to accede to the ultimatum of the Emperor of Russia. On the 2d of July, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities, Count Nesselrode announcing in his diplomatic circular that Russia regarded the presence of the allied fleets in the Turkish waters as a maritime occupation, and that, as a consequence of so threatening a demonstration, the Russian troops in Bessarabia had entered the Principalities, not for the purpose of making an offensive war, but "in order to re-establish the equilibrium of the reciprocal situations." Immediately upon this occupation followed the declaration of war by the Porte.

It is not to be concealed that the campaign thus far can hardly have answered the expectations of the Emperor of Russia. At the same time, it is not probable that the history of the engagements which have taken place will be accurately known till the war is ended. Stereotyped phrases, capital letters, official bulletins even, deserve but little credit in the progress of a campaign, and the experience of the Hungarian

revolution should teach us that newspaper victories do not determine the ultimate success of a war. It is impossible to judge even now of the relative gain and loss by the actions of Oltenitza, Citale, and, we may add, Sinope. It is quite clear that the first Turkish successes are full as much to be attributed to the unprepared state of the Russians, as to their own reckless valor. The Sultan was forced to declare war by his fanatical subjects, contrary to the expectations, not only of his allies, but of Nicholas himself, who, from the character of the conferences at Vienna, fully relied upon gaining his end by means of intimidation. Moreover, the circumstances of the operations on land have been such as to afford no indication as to what will be the fate of a Turkish army when it meets the enemy in an open field. The practice of exaggerating and even falsifying reports of battles is considered almost justifiable at the outset of a war, whose success depends exclusively upon the question of external assistance. The naval battle of Sinope, we presume to have been, to say the least, one of the most decisive affairs since the bombardment of Copenhagen; and yet our very reliable Transatlantic brethren have already devised two distinct theories of that action, and asserted them indifferently to subserve the double purpose of exciting a detestation of Russia and of encouraging the conviction that Turkey is amply able to cope with her enemy. We are told, therefore, on one day, that a more frightful carnage, inflicted by a fleet of line-of-battle ships and war-steamers upon half their number of peaceful transports incapable of resistance, has never disgraced the annals of the civilized world; and on the next, we hear with satisfaction of Russian ships that were burned, blown up, and sunk, of fearful casualties concealed in the bulletins, and of the astounding fact, that upon the whole the affair of Sinope may be set down as a *Turkish victory*. We are sure that, whatever may be the difference of opinion or prejudice on the general question, there are few who will not concur with us in hoping that Heaven may grant the doomed nation few such victories.

Perhaps an issue has never been presented to the consideration of the American people, in which less effort has been made to ascertain the real merits of the question, or less hon-



esty evolved in the discussion of it, than the present Russo-Turkish crisis. To say that it has not been fairly or adequately treated, would be only to say that it was a European affair in which somehow despotism was involved on one side or the other ; but unfortunately, this always safe and popular topic of declamation is rather a prominent feature in both governments, and is the most odious and repulsive as it exists in the country which has monopolized public sympathy. So long as we are content with second-hand thunder, and so long as we submit to being dragooned into holding the same opinion with the most venal and least authoritative of the European journals, so long we shall be obliged to look at matters, not as they are, but as the most selfish and most foolish of the human race wish them to be. A principal cause of the uncertainty and vacillation in the public opinion of this country on European matters is the astonishing delusion which prevails respecting the influence of such papers as the London Times. Never in the van of, rarely *au courant* with, public sentiment, the conduct of that journal, whose diurnal explosions are accepted by Cockneydom on both sides of the Atlantic as the nods of Olympian Jove, has been during the present crisis absolutely beneath the contempt which its disquisitions upon foreign polity usually merit. A partisan press in times of violent political excitement may be pardoned for an occasional deviation from propriety of expression, and for not always considering itself as strictly amenable to the ordinary obligations of veracity ; but there is no excuse for retailing in this country the falsehoods and trash manufactured to order in Europe. The most ridiculous feature in a London paper is the "important information" conveyed by its foreign correspondents, who seem to be selected solely for obtuseness and recklessness of assertion. The event has shown, that in the present matter not one of the predictions or settlements of this gentry has had the slightest foundation in fact, and out of the numerous communications we confess ourselves absurd enough to have read, we do not remember a single one which could not have been better concocted in a back attic overhanging the Thames.

Next after the fact of the war itself, the most remarkable

circumstance connected with the new Eastern question is the apparently unnatural alliance of France and England. One year ago, the Emperor of the French was the subject of a system of abuse in the English journals, aided by a vituperative vocabulary peculiarly their own, and comprising all the figures of speech fashionable in the locality of the fish-markets. Without attempting to convey any idea of the style employed for the purpose, we may state that Napoleon III. was vilified as a brigand and a pirate, whose highest ambition was to sail from Cherbourg some dark night, land at Portsmouth, rob the Bank of England of its twenty millions of sovereigns, and steal back to France again. This agreeable personage is now the ally upon whom "perfidious," "shop-keeping" Albion relies for support. There are no means of determining how far England and France may have tacitly or by secret negotiation bound themselves to sustain Turkey. As it is utterly absurd to suppose that either of these countries is under serious obligation to fight her battles, we may safely presume that each has an ulterior object in view; for they still have a right to withdraw from the contest, on the ground that advantage was taken by the Porte of the presence of an armament confessedly intended only to add force to negotiations already on foot, to involve *them* in a war with Russia as the only means of extricating itself from the stipulations imposed by existing treaties with that power, if such a war should prove, as it undoubtedly would, successful.

Turkey cannot be regarded as an independent power. If left to combat Russia single-handed and with her own resources, her subjection sooner or later would be inevitable, though it is probable that she would make a long and bloody resistance. A nation of seventy millions must conquer a nation of thirty-five millions, supposing the valor and discipline of their respective armies to be equal. Add to this, that the greater nation is the aggressor, and that it constitutes a political unit, while the weaker power has been repeatedly beaten, and is divided and distracted throughout its dominions; and the annihilation of the victor becomes only a question of time. The Ottoman empire has fared ill in every encounter with Russia since the reign of Peter the Great, and it will hardly

be contended that it has gained in any respect upon the power which is hemming it in with constantly approaching parallels of attack. The perfect and absolute integrity of Turkey, supposing that to be the *point d'appui* from which Russian aggrandizement is to be resisted by the Western powers, embraces considerably more than a question of geographical lines; it involves the perpetual predominance of the Mohammedan faith over every variety of the Christian religion, and the subjection to a foreign power of four fifths of the entire population of European Turkey. Waiving the question of the propriety or the policy of placing the Christian population of Turkey on a level with the *dogs* of Constantinople, either in the figurative language proverbial in the East, or in the ordinary courtesies of society, we may venture to allude to a much more serious inconvenience in a fact which has recently come to light, — that till this very interference of Russia, which it has been the fashion to reprobate with such severity, a Christian could not give evidence in a court of law against a Mussulman for murder, or theft, or any act of violence, either to his family, person, or property.

The city founded by the Roman Emperors, who had wrested its waters from the pirates of the Euxine, and whose limits marked out by Constantine were extended till the invisible guide who marched before him thought proper to stop, commands from its seven hills a position which under a civilized government would make it the queen city of the world. But its existence has been unnatural from the period of its foundation. Built in the era of the decline of the arts and of architecture, the fairest cities of Greece and Asia were despoiled to beautify it. Inhabited by an indolent, almost a degraded population, the older provinces of the Roman empire groaned under the burden of a taxation enforced to feed it and to pander to its pleasures. What it now is, the whole world knows. The nature of that power which has devolved upon its allies the disagreeable duty of protecting it, may be presented in a few words.

The Sultan, Abdul Medjid, according to the most flattering accounts, is a weak and indolent prince, who has been persuaded to attempt reforms upon a nation which, by the force

of its traditions and the tenets of its religious faith, is absolutely incapable of reform. The sanguine propagandist may describe results which ought to have followed the various innovations of the present government; but, unless every one competent to pronounce on the matter has falsified, the reforms in Turkey have all turned out failures. There is but one word which conveys any idea of the characteristics of the country; *decay* is stamped on every thing. European officers have in vain attempted to raise it to the rank of a military nation; for the Janizaries and the Bosnian Sipahis, who were formerly the chief reliance of the Ottoman power, have been ruthlessly exterminated by the very government they alone were capable of defending. Agriculture is almost unknown on a soil among the most fertile in the world, and the land which once supplied large empires with food now suffers a periodical famine. To preserve his property from confiscation by the state, the Turkish proprietor is compelled to mortgage it to a mosque, which by the legal arrangements is pretty certain to absorb it even before it becomes exhausted by the enormous usury demanded. Wheels, the greatest invention of man, are looked upon with pious horror. Beyond the walls of the larger cities, a solitary track for bullocks or donkeys serves the purpose of a road, and the miserable wastes they traverse are infested by robbers, whom the government is too feeble to arrest. The entire Moslem population is liable to be impressed into the army, and scarcely a third part ever return. The Christian population cannot hold real estate at all, and more than two thirds of the real estate held by Mussulmans is mortgaged to the mosques. A slave of to-day may be a Pacha to-morrow, and some of the highest officers of the government have been raised from the dregs of the population. A principle so democratic ought not to be objected to, were it not equally true that promotion is as likely to happen to a man notorious for his vices as to one respected for his virtues. Fraud and corruption run riot in every department of the administration of justice, without punishment or restraint; or if the offence is so flagrant that the culprit cannot escape, he may resume office again immediately upon the expiration of his sentence or the payment of his fine. The officers of the

state are generally in the pay of foreign powers. By an absurd system of revenue, even with the capitation tax which only Christians pay, the annual receipts are but thirty-five million dollars, of which ten millions are expended in the family of the Sultan. The taxes are unequally distributed, but are everywhere unjust and oppressive; and by a ruinous system of collection, the individual who purchases the privilege of farming the revenue frequently retains a larger sum than he renders into the treasury. By the intrigues of foreign nations, imports pay only three per cent. duty, and exports pay twelve; and the result is, that manufacturers abroad are enriched, while the labor of the country is paralyzed. As to the integrity of the Ottoman empire, which is to be preserved at such fearful risks, the Porte has seen one province after another annexed to Russia, Greece erected into a separate kingdom, Algeria incorporated with France, and Egypt under the dominion of a subject more formidable in war than the Sultan himself.

We have presented this faithful picture of the present condition of Turkey, not in justification of the insolence and rapacity of Russia, but as an attempt to divest the subject of that sham humanity with which those persons to whom words answer a better purpose than things have contrived to surround it. If humanity is to be regarded, the advantage is not upon the side of Turkey; but the question is simply one of political expediency, and on this ground alone the intervention of France and England must be deemed perfectly justifiable. Until some permanent combination can be effected in Western Europe, or some Continental power like Austria or France is so strengthened as to be able to cope singly with Russia, the temporary alliance between the two deadly and hereditary enemies will serve to check the further aggressions of the Czar westward. In this view, no embarrassments present themselves to the politician, and no hypocritical motive for interference need be offered. France at least has provoked neither scorn nor ridicule by attempting to invest the subject with attributes which do not belong to it. She is bound in honor to protect the Sultan from the consequences of her own intrigues, whether she anticipated those consequences or not.

Nor can she consent with safety to so formidable an acquisition as Constantinople by a power which regards itself as the conservator of despotic governments.

There is reason to believe that the French government foresaw, as early as last October, the uselessness of any further negotiation, and since that time its measures have looked only to war as the grand result. Its official organ, the *Moniteur*, studiously refrained from alluding to the Eastern question till the declaration of war by the Porte; but in the mean time the government, as its organ states, had weighed the question in all its bearings, and duly considered the effect of the disintegration of Turkey upon the European balance. Upon the eve of the establishment of the Empire, it was repeatedly announced that its policy would be peace; but such a declaration did not comprehend the inaction of France in the prospect of future dangers any more than in the event of an invasion of its soil. The *Moniteur*, therefore, announced that the maintenance of the rights and the security of the interests of all, were objects which the government of the Emperor would not lose sight of, till peace should be established upon the only foundation which could render it profitable and sure, and that "so many circumstances united in favor of a cause which is that of all Europe allow eventualities to be looked at with security, and the result to be awaited with confidence." This dispassionate but determined exposition of the intentions of the French government, together with the admirable papers of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, is among the very few developments of the affair to be commended for either dignity or truth.

It is the misfortune of England that the summit of her ambition is not to exercise an influence in, — for that would imply a fixed aim and a consistent purpose, — but to meddle with, Continental matters everywhere, and on every possible occasion. Wherever she can thrust herself, she contrives to be meddlesome, and by means of her maritime supremacy she is unhappily able to effect this quite often. We repeat, that her influence, small as it is, has not been good; for it is notorious that the country which regards itself as the champion of liberty has for fifty years played into the hands of despotism.

Her aristocracy, having nearly exhausted its Norman pride, bends to the petty German noblesse which dates its ancestry from the invasion of the Huns. Her ministers are moulded by craftier men in the employ of foreign powers, as we have already seen. From the facility with which a hostile coalition is formed in the House of Commons, a government will much prefer entailing ignominy upon the future, to sacrificing a temporary popularity. The press is ready at a moment's notice, to change sides and write down a ministry. The country does not sympathize with the court in its Continental affinities, and yet the court is regarded by foreigners as the country. England, therefore, without an earnest and definite diplomacy, generally stands in what the French call a false position, bound hand and foot when she is expected to act, plunging without an aim into affairs which do not concern her. These conspired with several other peculiarities, before alluded to in this journal, to persuade the Emperor of Russia that she could not be forced into a war. Nor was this delusion on his part destroyed by the fact that, while the French saw and prepared for the crisis, the London journals found it impossible to take any more dignified view of the matter than alternately to bluster and to "count the cost," with an occasional paltry insinuation that the French Emperor intended to desert the alliance, — accusations which were promptly disavowed at the Tuilleries.

It would seem, however, that the interests of England in the Eastern Question were sufficiently practical and direct, to insure her firmness in the crisis. From the first moment that she began to prey upon the territories and the revenues of the Indian princes, she has been jealous of the interference of other powers between her and a victim she intended to exhaust. Obviously her most formidable rival would be Russia, and at every successive step of that power toward India, the British empire in the East has become more precarious. The possession of Constantinople by Russia would open a new road to India, and give the final blow to a tenure of dominion already insecure. The march of an army of Cossacks through Afghanistan and Herat, though not depending upon a change of masters at the Bosphorus, would gather to its forces

such accessions from the ferocious and revengeful natives, as would expel the British for ever from the Indian peninsula. Admitting, however, the justice and morality on which the Indian empire was founded; conceding that its double government is the perfection of human wisdom, and that its subjects revel in an almost Utopian happiness; granting her Britannic Majesty's right to wring from a people whose average earnings are three cents a day an annual sum equal to *five times the entire revenue of Turkey*, for the support of an army which is gradually trampling out every vestige of an independent nationality, and to pay the interest on the *home* debt, — we are still obliged to confess, that we see vastly more important contingencies impending than are involved in the establishment of a limit to British aggression in India. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that commerce with Turkey amounts almost virtually to free-trade, while Russia protects her manufactures by high restrictive tariffs.\* To that numerous class of philanthropists, therefore, who have persuaded themselves that every principle of morality and religion is involved in the monopoly by Great Britain of the entire hardware and calico trade of the world, its action in the premises will appear perfectly proper.

Of the other powers which have been assisting in the attempts at pacification, Prussia cannot be reckoned on with certainty by either party. A patchwork kingdom, permitted by the Congress of Vienna to stretch its frontier across the Rhine by a direct robbery of the king of Saxony, that the armies of the Holy Alliance might at any time enter and devastate France, — checkmated in that scheme, so dangerous to the European equilibrium, the German Confederation, — connected with the court of Russia by marriage, yet probably quite aware that nations know no cousins, — that factitious monarchy will doubtless in the end act with the strongest, and lend its influence to those who will give it the most.

There remains Austria. It is to be assumed that, whatever decision the court of Vienna may arrive at in the matter of

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\* Imported manufactured goods pay a duty in Turkey of three, in Russia of sixty per cent.



an alliance, its action will not be determined by any consideration of friendship towards the Porte. When the latter power permitted certain Hungarian refugees to leave Asia Minor without the previous consultation with Austria which had been stipulated, M. Klezl, the Austrian minister, informed the Porte that such a proceeding would authorize the imperial court "to take into consideration only its own interest in its relations with the Ottoman empire." Shortly afterwards, the Vienna papers were filled with exaggerated accounts of the disturbances in Bosnia, giving the particulars of a revolution which never occurred. At the same time, it is clearly the interest of Austria to maintain what little authority the Porte still exercises over the Principalities, and to prevent the monopoly by Russia of a territory which controls the entire lower portion of the great artery of her empire, of which, however, she possesses neither the sources nor the outlet.

On the other hand, it is just possible that, in the difficulties of 1848-49, the young Emperor threw himself irrevocably into the arms of the Czar. In that case the course of Austria may be easily anticipated. But we do not admit such a hypothesis. There is no evidence to show that gratitude is a national weakness peculiar to the Hapsburgs, or that the imperial court would permit affection, any more than revenge, to interfere with its interests. By the terms of the Holy Alliance, under the veil of religion, popular insurrections within the dominions of any of the contracting powers were to be repressed by the intervention, if necessary, of the others. The *piety* of this intervention was to be its own reward. During the Hungarian ascendancy, revolutionism, with its headquarters in London, was in full blast through its committees all over the Continent. There were symptoms of a Polish rebellion; it were better to prevent an insurrection than to quench it in blood; and we see no reason to think that Nicholas would have been deterred even by the objection of Austria from marching his army against the Magyars. Several German papers during the intervention suggested various ways in which Russia proposed to remunerate herself; but there is no necessity for supposing any other motive than self-defence and the conservation of absolutism. In his procla-

mation at St. Petersburg, the Czar stated that all the troops were paid at his expense ; that he claimed no indemnification ; that the Emperor of Austria had *demande*d assistance against the "common enemy" ; and he invoked the aid of the God of battles to enable him to "quell the insurrection, and to annihilate the reckless men who threaten to disturb the quiet of *our province*." Nicholas was obliged to keep a large army on foot during the revolt ; it was better to keep it employed than idle ; he could have recalled it at a moment's warning, if wanted at home ; and, considering the peculiar fact that the mortality of a Russian army is as great in peace as in war, the inference is irresistible, that, great as the favor was, it was not such as to place Austria at the feet of the Czar. An implicit obedience to the dictation of Nicholas would imply that Russian intervention alone saved Austria from dissolution, a deduction she has never been willing to admit ; while a coöperation with the Western powers would imply that all fears of new disturbances in Hungary were removed, and that the house of Hapsburg no longer anticipated a contingency that would compel it to solicit an assistance which would most assuredly not again be granted. The action of the powerful empire of Austria, never more prosperous or firmly united than now, with a population more than double that of the United States, excluding the slaves of the latter, may therefore fairly be presumed to be unbiased in the present matter by any imaginary obligations, or any prejudices referable to a previous policy.

There is no insignificant amount of antagonism between the two nations growing out of the great idea of Panslavism. The Slavic movement in Austria was allied to conservatism, not to revolutionism. The political abstractionist and the philologist met together at Vienna, and the harmless studies of ethnology gradually developed themselves into the formidable doctrine of Panslavism. During the revolution the Slavic apostles remained inactive, but observant spectators of the futile efforts of democracy. A Slavic congress assembled at Prague in June, 1849, comprising the representatives of the Poles, Moravians, Slovacks, Servian, Illyrian, and other Slavic provinces, in opposition to the Germanic Diet then

sitting at Frankfort, and resolved that Austria should be placed at the head of the Slavic movement. The melancholy catastrophes attending the violent dissolution of that Congress are too well known.

The Russian has latterly learned that he too is of the great Slavonic race, whose historians are also its panegyrists, and which has laid out for itself the modest task of regenerating the world. The Slavic poets have taught him to dream of a universal dominion. Supervening upon the fanaticism of race is the enthusiasm of religion, and the humblest boor believes that, either in his generation or after him, the great race of which he is a part will fulfil its magnificent mission of conquering the world and stamping its own nationality on all the inhabitants of the globe, and that the leader in this final crusade is he to whom his political allegiance is due,—the CZAR. Russian ethnologists trace in the Slavic races of European Turkey the offshoots of the races which constitute the Northern empire, and, with the significance of national pride, invite them to repose once more upon the bosom of the mother country.

The history of Russia, as we have traced it, presents itself as a complete system of which self-aggrandizement is the central point, around which all other things assume their respective positions. That policy is traditional with the spirit of the nation, and hereditary in the Germanized family of Romanoff. From the outward pressure of his people, even the Czar cannot escape; it is the only power behind his throne. Uniting religious sentiment and the ties of race with a political power which it has come to consider as omnipotent, the nation feels itself prepared to succeed to the worn-out and unprofitable ideas of an effete civilization; and even the great Emperor of all the Russias must see clouds in the horizon, when he reflects that a suspension of conquest will give birth to a suspicion of weakness. The reign of Nicholas has already extended nearly over the period of a generation of men. As he compares his petty conquests in Asia Minor with the gigantic strides of Anna and Catharine and Alexander, something akin to a sense of degeneracy must be awakened, which neither his triumph over the liberties of Poland and of Hun-

gary, nor his many crafty treaties, can altogether stifle. Not in any divine mission to stand forth as the champion of Christianity, but in the consciousness that there is yet something to be fulfilled, lie the germs of the present crisis. Whether it is better that the peace of the world should be broken, than that another Romanoff should go down to his tomb without the barbaric title of Great, is a question for the modern Attila to settle with HIM from whom, in the simple faith of the people he governs, his authority and his mission are derived.

Happily, the destinies of European nations do not depend upon any balance of motives or duties within the breast of the Northern chief. There are other races in the Old World not disposed to admit the premises or the prerogatives of Pan-slavism. There are countries not so great as Russia, yet greater in everything that constitutes a state, not prepared to be blotted out by a ukase. The Northern empire still wishes to seem rather than to be, and her power, so formidable in defence and for internal coercion, will avail but little against nations skilled in the arts and fertile in the appliances of war. Let only France and England forget the contests of the past in the common danger that hovers round the future, let Austria disdain to hold the heritage of the Cæsars at the hands of the Czar, and there need be little fear that the Cossack shall ever again cross the Rhine, or that the double-headed eagle shall guard exclusively the waters of the Golden Horn.

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#### ART. X. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Life of BENJAMIN ROBERT HAYDON, Historical Painter, from his Autobiography and Journals.* BY TOM TAYLOR. London. 3 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1853. 2 vols.

THIS very attractive book has been, and will be, widely read. It is sad, it is strange, and yet it is sparkling with amusing anecdote, and contains, in its chaotic collection of the memoranda of forty years, a great deal of learning and of good sense. It will have a sort of perma-